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Introduction
The new Global Compact proposed by Secretary General Kofi Annan seeks
to improve corporate responsibility in the areas of human rights, labor
standards, and environmental protection. As such, the Global Compact is
a new effort that has been added to a long list of activities at the local,
national and international levels to make transnational corporations
(TNCs)1 better corporate citizens. In this article, the authors put the
t This article originated at the Cornell International Law Journal 2001 symposium.
* Associate Professor, Department of Political Science and International Relations,
University of Delaware.
** Doctoral Student, Department of Political Science and International Relations,
University of Delaware.
1. The terms "multinational corporation," "transnational corporation," and "mul-
tinational enterprise" are used interchangeably in the more recent literature. Although
this paper treats these terms as functional equivalents, we will employ "transnational
corporations" as a way to stress the importance of cross-border activities of global firms.
The former UN Commission and Center on Transnational Corporations, established in
1974 under the auspices of the Secretary General, made a distinction in the terminol-
ogy, based on the concepts of "multinational" versus "transnational," to denote an
emphasis on the multinational character of operations and/or ownership, as compared
to an emphasis on cross-border investment and transactions. This distinction is no
longer essential. Further, the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Develop-
ment (OECD) has assumed that the key concept with respect to multinational firms is
the global reach of their strategies and operations. The analytical distinction between
host and home countries is now almost obsolete. The OECD employs the term "Multina-
tional Enterprises" (MNEs) and defines the latter to comprise "companies or other enti-
ties whose ownership is private, state or mixed, established in different countries and so
linked that one or more of them may be able to exercise a significant influence over the
activities of others and, in particular, to share knowledge and resources with the others,"
in ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, THE OECD GuIDELINEs
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Global Compact into a larger empirical and theoretical context. This arti-
cle discusses the Global Compact (GC or Compact) in relation to similar
efforts in other quarters, and then ties these various political and legal
activities to larger issues raised by theories of international relations. Over
the past two decades, international relations (IR) theory has become
increasingly occupied by studies of international regimes and global gov-
ernance. To gain an understanding of the GC's potential for success, we
must think of the Compact as a case study for the IR theory topics of inter-
national regimes and global governance.
This article is divided into four parts. First, the article considers
whether or not the Global Compact might have any impact on the behavior
of TNCs. Perhaps the GC, despite its noble intentions, is doomed to fail-
ure. The authors find hope for the GC's potential for a positive impact
from some of the evidence provided in prior empirical studies on the rela-
tionship between TNCs and human rights. A short summary of these stud-
ies leads to Part II. The second section of this paper will address a question
raised at the 2001 Cornell Symposium on the Global Compact: is the Com-
pact's voluntary regulatory approach the best or most efficient way to fos-
ter morally responsible corporate behavior?
Part III of this article focuses on TNCs and labor rights through the
lens of IR theory. Is there now, or will there be in the future, a global
regime for TNCs and labor rights? Alternatively, do IR theories of global
governance better inform our understanding of international efforts such
as the GC? In the conclusion of this paper, we look ahead to what may
come next in the areas of TNCs, labor rights, and environmental rights.
Part IV offers speculations on future reforms in these areas.
I. Prior Studies on TNCs and Human Rights
Panelists at the Cornell Symposium on the Global Compact were asked if
the Compact's opt-in, self-regulatory approach is the best means for
improving global corporate conduct. However, this question presupposes a
prior issue. Do we have reason to believe that the Global Compact will
have any impact whatsoever on the behavior of private corporations? Many
FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES, Introduction, para. 8 (1976), available at http://
www.itcilo.it/english/actrav/telearn/global/ilo/guide/oecd.htm#Introductin (last vis-
ited Oct. 7, 2001). See also the subsequent revisions of the Guidelines, ORGANISATION
FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, OECD DECLARATION AND DECISIONS ON
INTERNATIONAL INVESM4ENT AND MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRIsES, 1991 REIW (1992; 1997).
For a discussion of the problems of definition of the term "multinational corporations"
see PETER MUCHLINSKI, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRIsEs AND THE LAw 12-15 (1995). For a
detailed discussion of the theoretical research on TNCs, see MARK CASSON, MULTINA-
TIONAL CORPORATIONS (1990); RHYs JENKINS, TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND UNEVEN
DEVELOPMENT: THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF CAPITAL AND THE THIRD WORLD (1987). For
a working definition and discussion of related issues in international political economy,
see ROBERT GILPIN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 231-262
(1987). For recent data on the global operations of TNCs see UNITED NATIONS CONFER-
ENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, WORLD INvESTmENT REPORT 2000: CROSs-BORDER MERG-
ERS AND AcQUIsITIoNs AND DEVELOPMENTS (2000).
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private businesses consistently resist the best efforts of national govern-
ments to force them to improve their compliance with labor standards and
environmental regulations. Perhaps the GC will fare no better. On the
other hand, one can be a little more optimistic about the GC's hopes for
success by looking carefully at the full range of empirical studies com-
pleted to date, studies that detail the connections between TNCs and
human rights.
The results of these empirical studies are mixed, to say the least. Most
of the research tries to identify whether TNCs have had a positive or a
negative impact on civil-political rights and socioeconomic welfare in Third
World nations. Quantitative studies of aggregate data from over 50 Third
World nations by Meyer have found that, at the broadest international
level, increased investment by TNCs is associated with improved levels of
civil rights and better economic welfare across developing nations.2 Case
studies by Spar and others have also found improvements in TNC treat-
ment of their labor forces when businesses are compelled by the "spotlight
effect" to clean up their act. The spotlight effect kicks in when media pres-
sure or consumer boycotts single out TNC violations of labor rights (such
as child labor used by Nike and Reebok to produce soccer balls in Paki-
stan). Subsequent efforts by TNCs to improve their public images force
corporations to "export human rights" with a switch to better labor stan-
dards.3 Perhaps the Global Compact could be used to enhance the spot-
light effect.
Another set of studies has shown the opposite to be true in too many
cases. A follow-up study by Smith et al. questions the ability to generalize
from Meyer's results. 4 Smith's team, like Meyer, also analyzed aggregate
data from scores of less developed countries (LDCs), and their results ran
counter to Meyer's conclusions. Smith's team found an inverse correlation
in their data between TNC investment and indicators of human rights in
LDCs. Meyer also presented case studies that found consistent patterns of
rights violations by TNCs in Latin America and Asia.5
This is not the time or the place to try to make sense of these conflict-
ing empirical studies. 6 We can postulate a potential positive impact by the
2. William H. Meyer, Human Rights and MNCs: Theory Versus Quantitative Analysis,
18 HuM. RTs. Q. 368 (1996) [hereinafter Meyer, Human Rights and MNCs]. Meyer's 1998
work also shows a positive correlation between foreign economic aid and better human
rights in the Third World. See WILLIAM H. MEYER, HuMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL
POLITICAL ECONOMY IN THIRD WORLD NATIONS: MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS, FOREIGN
AID, AND REPRESSION 113-139 (1998) [hereinafter MEYER, POLITICAL ECONOMY].
3. See Debora L. Spar, The Spotlight and the Bottom Line: How Multinationals Export
Human Rights, 77 FOREIGN AF. 7 (1998).
4. Jackie Smith et al., Human Rights and the Global Economy: A Response to Meyer,
21 Hum. RTs. Q. 207 (1999).
5. Meyer, Human Rights and MNCs, supra note 2. For a detailed account, see
MEYER, POLITICAL ECONOMY, supra note 2, at 141-195.
6. For a discussion of how these conflicting results make sense and are indeed to
be expected given the complex realities of TNCs and human rights, see William H.
Meyer, Confirming, Infirming and 'Falsifying' Theories of Human Rights: Reflections on
Smith, Bolyard, and Ippolito Through the Lens of Lakatos, 21 HUM. RTS. Q. 220 (1999).
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Global Compact without trying to settle the debate raised by prior
research. The relevant points from prior empirical studies for any discus-
sion of the impact of the Global Compact are twofold: (1) results from the
anti-TNC camp indicate that violations of rights and environmental degra-
dation often occur at the hands of TNCs; (2) however, results from the pro-
TNC camp indicate that corporations do not always violate human rights
and environmental regulations. Therefore, there is reason to hope that the
Compact could reward the behavior of responsible TNCs, while shaming at
least some of the irresponsible TNCs into better promoting human rights.
II. Is the Global Compact the Best Way?
This question is almost impossible to answer. In order to know whether
the Global Compact is the best or the most efficient way to improve corpo-
rate behavior, one would first have to be able to identify and isolate the
impact of the GC on TNCs. The impact of the GC would then have to be
separated from the impact of other efforts to improve TNC behavior, and
the relative impact of the GC versus non-GC efforts would have to be mea-
sured. We will not attempt anything like that in this article. Indeed, such a
study is most likely an impossible task. What we can do is compile a rep-
resentative listing of the many things that have been done, and are being
done, to bring TNCs into better compliance with international labor stan-
dards. The Global Compact is just one of many attempts to improve labor
standards. The GC may be one of the best ways, but it is just one among
many efforts. A brief review of the range of such efforts will show that the
Global Compact is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for making
reluctant TNCs better global citizens. This summary of attempts to
improve TNC behavior will be divided according to different "levels of anal-
ysis." Three standard levels of analysis used in IR theory are the interna-
tional level, the regional level, and the national level. The summary begins
with a review of efforts at the international level. 7
A. International Efforts That Complement the Global Compact
When Kofi Annan first proposed the Global Compact in 1999, many
efforts were already underway to force socially responsible behavior on
reluctant TNCs. At the global level, some of these movements have been
promoted by international organizations such as the International Labor
Organization (ILO), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the
World Bank. In 1998, the ILO released a Declaration on Fundamental
Principles and Rights at Work. The ILO Declaration created a set of global
labor standards as universal principals of human rights. These standards
would require TNCs to observe freedom of association, nondiscrimination,
7. The summary that follows is not meant to be a comprehensive listing of all previ-
ous efforts to improve corporate social responsibility. Rather, this discussion focuses on
those efforts that we take to be most important and representative of the overall (com-
bined) efforts by international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and
national governments.
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and the right to collective bargaining.8 The ILO Declaration prohibits use
of forced labor and child labor. The IMF and the World Bank have also
moved toward establishing standards for labor rights as new elements of
loan conditionality.
Enforcement of social standards through conditionality principles is
now taking place at the IMF and the World Bank. Some labor standards
are more eligible for consideration by the World Bank (e.g., child labor,
prohibition of forced labor, equal opportunity), while others (e.g., freedom
of association) are less susceptible. The International Financial Corpora-
tion (IFC), a member of the World Bank Group, has set certain standards
related to child labor and the environment. TNCs that participate in IFC
development projects are expected to observe these standards and prac-
tices. Because of their power-based structure, these international financial
institutions do not need a new, formal international agreement to legiti-
mize such actions. An enforcement mechanism is already in place, tied to
the principal of conditionality. Even without outright coercion, recipient
countries and participating TNCs are being encouraged to improve their
labor standards. Despite their neoliberal economic bias, the IMF and the
World Bank are directly involved in upgrading the social environment of
developing countries. The new commitment by the World Bank to struc-
tural social reforms-including "good government," poverty reduction, and
an end to child labor-shows that the Bank has increased its attention to
social issues and no longer has a single-minded focus on macroeconomic
efficiency criteria. IMF and World Bank policies to promote workers'
rights through their program-based lending are viable ways to radically
upgrade labor standards at the global level.
The UN has also fielded initiatives to promote corporate social respon-
sibility that are independent of, and parallel to, the Global Compact. For
example, the UN Subcommission for the Protection and Promotion of
Human Rights has developed its own detailed draft code of conduct for
businesses that is far more rigorous than the GC. 9
Another process at work at the international level is highlighted by
Bhagwati's work on "harmonization." The upward harmonization of inter-
national labor standards is predicted by economic theories of public goods.
The demand for harmonization as identified by Bhagwati is based on the
assumptions of fair trade, fair competition, and a need to conform to cer-
tain formal arrangements in order to achieve increased benefits. 10 The
8. INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION, DECLARATION OF FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES
AND RIGHTS AT WORK (1998), available at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/
decl/declaration/text/index.htm (last visited Oct. 6, 2001).
9. See UNITED NATIONS, CHARTER-BAsED BODIES LITERATURE DATABASE, PROPOSED
DRAFT HUMAN RIGHTS CODE OF CONDUCT FOR COMPANIES (United Nations, Working
Paper, 25 May 2000), available at http://www.unchr.ch.huridocda/huridocds.nsf (last
visited Oct. 5, 2001); see also Morton Winston, Amnesty International and the UN
Global Compact (2001) (unpublished paper presented at the Cornell International Law
Journal Symposium) (on file with author).
10. FAIR TRADE AND HARMONIZATION: PREREQUISITES FOR FREE TRADE? Uagdish
Bhagwati & Robert E. Hudec eds., 1996).
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normative component of harmonization theory reveals an upward, rather
than downward, convergence of labor standards. The economic logic of
upward harmonization is connected to the existence of different jurisdic-
tions that prevent the automatic market clearance mechanism from achiev-
ing economies of scale or uniformity of standards at the global level.
Different regulations lead to externalities, materialized in absolute or rela-
tive losses of welfare and suboptimal public policy choices. As Bhagwati
points out, harmonization does not directly negate such externalities,
because transborder spillovers (e.g., failures, increased transaction costs,
deterioration of standards) continue to exist. Thus the purpose of harmo-
nization at the international level is not to provide a uniform economic
environment, but to "prevent a jurisdiction from deliberately taking advan-
tage of externalities by lowering its standards to impose costs on others
while reaping benefits. The harmonization argument is perhaps strongest
in the context of protecting international public goods."1 Even though
Bhagwati's examples refer to environment-related public goods, this argu-
ment can also be used with respect to labor standards. Labor standards are
public goods that are provided (in most cases) by a domestic regulatory
actor-i.e., national governments.
International trade connects the production and consumption of
goods across borders. This transfer of the very essence of standards-the
way they are provided and consumed-becomes the point of reference for
the detection and reduction of externalities. Harmonization at the interna-
tional level, pursued by states through formal or informal multilateral
processes or through unilateral standard setting, are two ways by which a
government might provide the necessary public goods. The case of the
determination of standards through coalition formation 2 is a viable alter-
native-reflected in regional codes of conduct (see below) or in industry-
wide, private, standard-setting arrangements. Such shared practices are
becoming increasingly common for a number of industries, and within
more and more geographic regions. The distinction between public goods
versus "restricted-use" (or "club") goods with respect to labor standards
relates to the costs involved and their ultimate allocation, depending on
who the provider is. Standards (in this respect) represent costs (or a policy
that imposes additional costs) to domestic firms; their purpose is to correct
an externality. By correcting that externality, an improvement in domestic
welfare is achieved-i.e. higher labor standards are beneficial. The costs of
correction, however, need to be offset (Rodrik, quoting Freeman, suggests
they should be offset by taxation: a country can, therefore, "buy" higher
labor standards).' 3 Obviously, it is the workers themselves who ultimately
11. David W. Leebron, Lying Down with Procrustes: An Analysis of Harmonization
Claims, in FREE TRADE AND HARMONIZATION: PREREQUISITES FOR FREE TRADE?, id. at 55.
12. For example, by means of voluntary industry-based, or individual company
codes of conduct. Leebron has referred to similar efforts as "private" harmonization. Id.
at 93.
13. Dani Rodrik, Globalisation and Labour, or: If Globalisation Is a Bowl of Cherries,
Why Are There So Many Glum Faces Around the Table?, in MARKET INTEGRATION, REGIONAL-
ISM, AND THE GLOBAL EcONOMY 117, 128-132 (Richard Baldwin et al. eds., 1999).
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bear the costs. Empirical studies have observed that a correlation between
higher labor standards and labor costs is especially true for labor-intensive
industries (the most common type in Third World nations), unless the
costs are offset by increases in productivity. Increases in productivity are
more likely in the case of capital-intensive industries (not as relevant to
most developing countries). 14 Such theoretical assumptions have been ver-
ified by some of the relevant empirical research, including case studies.' 5
B. Regional Efforts That Supplement the Global Compact
Hopes for the international success of the Global Compact are also stimu-
lated by the many efforts already taking place in various regional settings.
When the United States, Canada and Mexico entered into the North Ameri-
can Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), side agreements on labor standards
and environmental protection were added by the Clinton administration.
These NAFTA protocols on labor and the environment created no new
international standards. Rather, they simply require each member state to
vigorously enforce their own (preexisting) labor and environmental laws. 16
NAFTA also grafts new regional dispute panels on top of the national
means of enforcement. The side agreement on labor (the North American
Agreement on Labor Cooperation) created a labor grievance system and
national committees in each country known as the National Administrative
Offices (NAOs). NAOs receive complaints of unfair labor practices from
labor unions and other nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Petition-
ers are free to bring their complaints before the NAO of any of the three
states. Each NAO has the power to investigate complaints, and if neces-
sary, impose trade sanctions for violations of labor laws, violations of child
labor prohibitions, failures to meet minimum wage requirements, or fail-
ures to meet occupational health and safety standards. 17
NAFTA created a similar process for environmental regulation and
enforcement. The North American Agreement on Environmental Coopera-
tion (NAFTA's side agreement on the environment) created a Commission
on Environmental Cooperation (CEC). The CEC has its headquarters in
Montreal and contains cabinet-level environmental officials from each of
the three states. Individuals and NGOs can file complaints before the CEC.
The CEC then has the power to manage a lengthy review and dispute settle-
ment process. There are many problems with the CEC process, including
its glacial pace and its weak enforcement powers. However, in theory it
does have the power to impose fines on any of the three parties to NAFTA
for failures to enforce their environmental laws. We must hasten to add
that any fines would be levied against the government of the offending
14. Id. at 130.
15. See, e.g., C. Foster Knight, NAFTA Promises Payoff in Environmental Benefits, F.
APPLIED RES. & PUB. PoL'Y, Summer 1995, at 29.
16. All three countries, including Mexico, have very good environmental protection
and labor laws "on the books". Most problems arise primarily due to lack of enforce-
ment (especially in Mexico).
17. For more on the NAOs, including specific cases brought before these dispute
panels, see MEYER, PoLmca. EcONOMY, supra note 2, at 141-195.
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TNC. The CEC does not have the power to impose fines directly against a
TNC that violates environmental laws.18
On the other side of the Atlantic, the European Union (EU) has also
taken regional steps to promote labor rights and corporate social responsi-
bility. Within its program under the Generalized System of Preferences 19
(GSP), the EU has created a unique incentive scheme that extends eco-
nomic preferences to developing nations that have upgraded their labor
rights and environmental regulations.
The current GSP scheme for the European Union dates back to
1994.20 The basic legislation was subsequently revised by Council Regula-
tion 2820/98 of 21 December 1998.21 The key features of the EU's GSP
include tariff modulation, country-sector graduation, and special incentive
arrangements. The special incentive provisions, operational as of 1998,
refer to labor rights and environmental protection. Special trade arrange-
ments are given to countries that comply with ILO Conventions Nos. 87
and 98 concerning the rights to organize and bargain collectively, and No.
138 with respect to the minimum age for employment. The incentives for
environmental protection apply to products originating in tropical rain for-
ests,22 and are granted to countries that enforce legislation incorporating
the standards of the International Tropical Timber Organization.
In order to take advantage of the incentive arrangements, Third World
governments must implement and monitor compliant legislation, and pro-
vide full disclosure of any sectoral restrictions that must be detailed by
production sector (Article 11). The Republic of Moldova has become the
first beneficiary of the arrangements concerning labor rights for its exports
to the EU. 23 Identical procedures-of national certification, monitoring,
and administrative cooperation-are applicable to the special incentives
concerning environmental protections.
Such social and environmental incentives, while based on initial certi-
fication, are not automatic or permanent. They are contingent upon con-
stant monitoring procedures and administrative cooperation between the
beneficiaries and EU authorities. Thus the monitoring procedures under
both the social and the environmental incentive clauses provide consis-
tency and prevent sectoral exceptions, especially as far as labor rights are
concerned. The latter observation is highly relevant to TNC production in
18. Id. at 172. For more on the CEC, including specific cases and other weaknesses
in the system, see id. at 171-73.
19. See the detailed discussion of U.S policy in Section C below for a description of
GSP programs. GSP programs are a component of the UNCTAD institutional
framework.
20. All GSP schemes represent extensions of the multilateral liberalization under the
WTO system. The schemes are regarded as complementary to WTO instruments, and
foster the integration of the developing countries into the world economy.
21. 1998 Oj. (L 357) 1-13; 1998 Oj. (L 189) 13.
22. 1998 Oj. (L 357) 6 (Art. 9, in accordance with Annex VIII).
23. Commission Regulation 1649/2000 of 25 July 2000 Granting the Republic of
Moldova the Benefit of the Special Incentive Arrangements Concerning Labour Rights,
2000 Oj. (L 189) 13.
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developing nations. On the one hand, the EU's incentive scheme has a
direct disciplinary effect. On the other hand, it promotes interaction
between states and corporations and is likely to lead to a sustained upgrad-
ing of labor and environmental conditions in developing countries.
An organization that unites the EU with the U.S., Canada andJapan is
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).
The OECD is a transregional body that has developed its own programs to
enhance corporate social responsibility. The OECD has promulgated a set
of Guidelines on Multinational Enterprises (or MNEs; for the sake of con-
sistency, we will continue to refer to MNEs in this article as TNCs). 24 The
OECD created no enforcement mechanism to go along with its Guide-
lines.25 Compliance with OECD documents by TNCs is voluntary. How-
24. ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, THE OECD
GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTRmISES, REVISION 2000 (2000), available at http://
www.oecd.org//daf/investment/guidelines/rnetext.htm [hereinafter The Guidelines], do
not require a legal definition of the term "multinational enterprise", to which they are
applied. The Guidelines represent:
[R]ecommendations addressed by governments to multinational enterprises.
They provide voluntary principles and standards for responsible business con-
duct consistent with applicable laws. The Guidelines aim to ensure that the oper-
ations of these enterprises are in harmony with government policies, to
strengthen the basis of mutual confidence between enterprises and the societies
in which they operate, to help improve the foreign investment climate and to
enhance the contribution to sustainable development made by multinational
enterprises.
Id. For a recent account by the OECD Secretariat with respect to the Guidelines see
ARGHYmOS A. FATOUROS, THE OECD GUIDELINES IN A GLOBALIZING WORLD (7 OECD Work-
ing Paper 66, 1999, DAFFE/IME/RD (99)3, Feb. 17, 1999), available at http://
wvv.oecd.org//daf/investment (last visited Oct. 7, 2001). For a complete edition of The
Guidelines, including commentary on their scope and nature, see OECD WORKING
PAPERS, THE OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES (OECD, Doc. OCDE/
GD(97)40, 1999). The revised OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises were
adopted by the governments of the 30 Member countries of the OECD and Argentina,
Brazil and Chile on the occasion of the OECD's annual Council meeting at ministerial
level in Paris on 27June 2000. Following the completion of the revision, the Committee
on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises (CIME) issued as a working
document the relevant texts with respect to the update. See The OECD Declaration and
Decisions on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises: Basic Texts, DAFFE/
IME(2000)20 (Nov. 9, 2000).
25. See Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, OECD Princi-
ples of Corporate Governance, SG/CG(99)5 (Apr. 19, 1999), available at http://
www.oecd.org/daf/governance/principles.htm (last visited June 27, 2001) for a detailed
list of the standards, which represent a set of non-binding principles and embody the
views of Member countries on this issue. The Principles:
focus on governance problems that result from the separation of ownership and
control. Some of the other issues relevant to a company's decision-making
processes, such as environmental or ethical concerns, are taken into account but
are treated more explicitly in a number of other OECD instruments (including
the Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and the Convention and Recom-
mendation on Bribery) and the instruments of other international
organisations.
Id. The principles refer to the management of the firm, while incorporating structural
factors and the relevance of public policy for microeconomic decision-making. Thus, the
principles need to be analytically and substantively distinguished from the Guidelines
on MNEs. The Guidelines are non-binding recommendations to enterprises, made by the
509
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ever, the Guidelines have a unique importance because they promote direct
involvement by TNCs, and they seek to avoid double standards with
respect to labor rights and the environment. They constitute an attempt to
apply home-country labor standards (those that apply to TNCs operating
within OECD states) to all TNC activities around the globe (both inside
and outside of OECD territory). The Guidelines are also important
because they provide a link between the state and the corporate level-
through the establishment of National Contact Points in each home coun-
try.2 6 The OECD also encourages NGO participation is this process. By
providing for the involvement of NGOs, mainly in regard to the tasks of
monitoring and reporting, the National Contact Points can help establish a
domestic regulatory control system that reaches beyond the borders of the
home country and extends outward over the TNCs' global operations.
The OECD approach seeks to link its member states to various non-
state actors, and then promote corporate social responsibility via mutual
participation. By setting behavioral standards for corporations that are
based on the principle of home-country control, and by encouraging indus-
try-based codes of conduct, the OECD approach enhances the importance
of social responsibility criteria in the global operations of TNCs. In this
respect, the OECD system reflects a key element of the Global Compact.
An effective labor rights regime will work only if there is a commitment to
it by many actors operating at different levels in the international system.
This realization is reflected in the United Nations initiative for a Global
Compact on human rights, labor, and the environment. The main task of
the GC initiative is to put a human face on globalization through shared
values and principles. The sustained support on behalf of UN agencies for
incorporation of labor and environmental standards into business prac-
tices underlines the need to integrate the TNCs themselves as sources of
leadership. The logic of the Global Compact thus points not only to a call
for increased social responsibility on the part of corporations, but also to
their legitimate role as participants in the maintenance of the regime.
C. National Policies and Transnational Activism
Advanced industrialized nations are adopting new unilateral polices to pro-
mote corporate social responsibility. Unsatisfied with the pace and scope
of these national efforts, transnational activists have developed their own
thirty-three governments that adhere to them. Their aim is to help TNCs operate in
harmony with government policies and with societal expectations.
26. The National Contact Points are established under the responsibility of govern-
ments. The institutions hosting them vary according to domestic public policy choices.
Although the Guidelines set criteria and recommendations with respect to their opera-
tion, the National Contact Points differ also according to the scope of activities in which
they engage. This lack of uniformity, however, should not be considered as a disadvan-
tage. National Contact Points serve as a forum for public discussion and provide trans-
parency and access for non-state actors (NGOs and citizens). Thus, they can be seen as
a first step to resolve issues with respect to TNCs' global operations within the home-
country, i.e., at the national level. For a detailed discussion of the mechanism of opera-
tion of the National Contact Points, see The Guidelines, supra note 24, at 12, 54-59
(Annex 3) for a list of established National contact points by country.
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arsenal of tactics to target irresponsible businesses. A brief review of these
national and transnational efforts will conclude our summary of efforts
outside the Global Compact, and lead to our consideration of corporate
social responsibility within the context of IR theory.
Both the U.S. and the EU have imposed economic sanctions for viola-
tions of labor rights under their GSP programs. The GSP (or Generalized
System of Preferences) provides tariff-free access to markets in the devel-
oped countries for selected goods originating from developing nations.
The U.S. Congress amended America's GSP program in 1984 to attach new
human rights conditions that Third World nations must meet to qualify for
GSP trade advantages. To be a beneficiary of the U.S. GSP, a country must
be "taking steps to afford workers internationally recognized workers'
rights, including freedom of association, the right to organize and bargain
collectively, freedom from forced labor, a minimum age of work for chil-
dren, and acceptable conditions at work relating to hours, wages and
health and safety."27
An example of American economic sanctions under these provisions
of the GSP would be the case of Chile. Chile was excluded from the GSP
program in 1987 because of violations of workers' rights under Pinochet's
dictatorial regime. This action was "an important element in putting pres-
sure on Chile at the time of the ending of the Pinochet government."28 Of
course, such pressure under the GSP is only an indirect means to punish
corporations that ignore labor rights. The sanctions are imposed against a
nation in hopes that the targeted government will then put pressure on
businesses (perhaps through new legislation) to improve working condi-
tions. This indirect approach is similar (in that respect) to the use of NAOs
and the CEC under NAFTA.
The indirect approach has also been employed by more recent legisla-
tion that prohibits imports into the U.S. of goods produced by child labor
or forced labor. Senator Tom Harkin (Democrat, Iowa) sponsored a new
law in 1992 to stop the importation of commodities produced by child
labor. Such legislation is controversial, and has even been attacked by
some child labor advocates. Passage of the Child Labor Deterrence Act
allegedly led to the loss of 50,000 jobs for impoverished youth virtually
"overnight.29 Even if these charges are true, they hardly justify a claim that
Congress should not oppose the use of child labor by TNCs. American
economic sanctions that lead to unemployment for children are simply the
basis of an argument in favor of increased foreign aid that targets primary
education in the Third World (in tandem with any prohibitions against
child labor).
In a follow-up, Representative Bernard Sanders (Independent, Ver-
mont) drafted legislation that targeted all forms of forced labor. The 1997
27. Working for Labor Rights: An Interview with Pharis Harvey, MULTINATIONAL MONI-
TOR, Dec. 1993, at 17.
28. Id. at 20.
29. Shahidul Alam, The Use of Child Labor Does Not Always Violate Human Rights, in
HuMAN RIGHTS: OPPOSING Vimwpomrrs 81, 82 (Mary E. Williams ed., 1998).
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Sanders Amendment to Section 307 of the 1930 Tariff Act bans importa-
tion of products made with forced labor (e.g. prison labor in China),
including products made with "forced labor or/and indentured labor."'30
At the broadest level, federal law also calls for economic sanctions against
states that do not enforce internationally recognized worker rights for
TNCs operating within their borders. For example, the 1988 Omnibus
Trade and Competitiveness Act amended Section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act
(now known in trade circles as "Super 301").3 1 Failure to ensure labor
rights now is considered to be an unfair trade practice under the terms of
Super 301, subjecting America's trading partners to a wide range of trade
sanctions.32
Another relatively new approach in U.S. foreign policy is more proac-
tive. A series of media scandals in the 1990s brought attention to the use of
Third World sweatshops by TNCs. High-profile celebrities like Michael Jor-
dan and Kathie Lee Gifford were accused of profiting from sweatshops that
produce the clothing they endorse for Nike and Wal Mart. This new atten-
tion to sweatshops compelled the Clinton Administration to establish the
Apparel Industry Partnership (ALP) in 1996. The AP later evolved into the
Fair Labor Alliance (FLA). Both the AP and the FLA were set up as cooper-
ative arrangements between government, corporations, and some NGOs.
They produced a code of conduct for TNCs, and a call for corporations to
allow independent monitoring of their production facilities. TNCs that
adopt the code and participate in the FLA are rewarded with a "no sweat-
shop" label for their clothing. Critics and NGOs that refused to endorse
these efforts, however, see such policies as little more than a way for TNCs
like Nike to gain a better public image while fooling consumers into think-
ing that conditions are improving for Third World labor. One critic labeled
these efforts "the good housekeeping seal of approval to a kinder, gender
sweatshop." 33
The 1990s also witnessed a trend toward TNCs developing their own
(internal) codes of conduct. Under intense pressure from NGOs like
Amnesty International (which drafted a model code of conduct for TNCs
in 1996), corporations have pledged to uphold labor rights, practice non-
discrimination in the workplace, and protect the environment.34 Such
promises mean little, however, unless they are translated into practice. Ver-
ification of the fact that TNCs are living up to their pledges requires inde-
pendent monitoring of production facilities, a step that Nike and others
30. 19 U.S.C. § 1307 (2000). This amendment, signed into law in May 2000, states
that forced labor or/and indentured labor includes forced or indentured child labor. Id.
31. See 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1988) (defining policies that restrict worker rights as
unfair and inequitable).
32. Pharis J. Harvey et al., Developing Effective Mechanisms for Implementing Labor
Rights in the Global Economy, at http://www.laborrights.org/projects/globalecon/ilrf/
ilrf2b.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2001).
33. Anti-Sweatshop Code gets Clinton Blessing, NEws JoumAL, Apr. 13, 1997, at A4.
34. For more on corporate and NGO codes of conduct, see MEYER, POLITICAL ECON-
oMY, supra note 2, at 197.
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have been loath to take.35
No review of efforts to promote corporate social responsibility would
be complete without mention of the Battle in Seattle and other grass-roots
efforts to bring TNCs to heel. A fascinating coalition of labor unions, envi-
ronmentalists, consumer advocates, and Third World lobbyists has banded
together and targeted TNCs, the World Trade Organization (WTO), and
"globalization" as the greatest evils in the post-Cold War world. We have
avoided any discussion of the WTO and labor rights to this point because
that will feature prominently in our treatment of IR theory and global gov-
ernance that follows. However, we must give credit where credit is due.
The Seattle Coalition all but shut down the 1999 ministerial conference of
the WTO with its successful use of disruptive protests. Whether you agree
with their views or not, everyone must acknowledge the ability of the Seat-
tle Coalition to successfully have their position recognized in a way that
was never possible in the past. This same coalition has disrupted more
recent international economic forums in Prague, Davos, and Quebec.
The Seattle Coalition is significant in much the same way as are con-
sumer boycotts against TNCs. Both trends represent movements within
civil society that bypass the normal political and legal channels for putting
pressure on TNCs. Both tactics (coalition protests and consumer boycotts)
have kept the issue of corporate social responsibility on the media agenda
and in the public eye. Without these grass-roots movements, the media,
public officials and international organizations would most likely allow the
often-intractable problem of making TNCs better corporate citizens to fade
from their scrutiny.
While our discussion of the multifaceted efforts to enhance corporate
social responsibility has not been comprehensive (no doubt our readers
can come up with other examples that we have not included), we hope it
has been extensive enough to reveal the complexity of both the problem
and its possible solutions. We turn now from this laundry list of socio-
politico-legal-economic trends to a treatment of corporate responsibility
within the context of international relations theory.
III. The Global Compact, International Regimes, and Global
Governance
Much of the scholarly attention to the issue of labor rights and TNCs has
revolved around the possible creation of an international "regime." The
most commonly cited definition of a regime comes from IR theorist Ste-
phen Krasner. According to Krasner, a regime consists of "[p]rinciples,
norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actor expec-
35. Phil Berry, corporate spokesman for Nike at the Cornell symposium on the
Global Compact, argued that independent monitors have their own agendas and there-
fore will not be allowed into Nike facilities. Instead, Nike pays for their own "monitors,"
leading critics to charge that no truly independent watchdogs are able to oversee treat-
ment of labor or environmental practices by the firm.
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tations converge in a given issue-area."36 Regimes are issue-specific or
area-specific. For example there is one regime for trade (the WTO), and
another separate regime for monetary relations (the IMF and World Bank).
The most highly developed regimes include: (a) an institutional framework
(e.g., an international organization); (b) a set of specific rules and norms,
and; (c) a more general set of shared expectations regarding acceptable
behavior. While some may see the Global Compact as a new regime (or as
part of a new regime) for corporate social responsibility, the facts of the
matter are more complicated than that.
No distinct regime yet exists to manage labor rights and TNCs. How-
ever, the outlines of a possible regime have been noted by many observers.
There are some interesting parallels between the regime already created for
human rights and nation-states as compared to the normative activity sur-
rounding TNCs. Normative regime-building, whether for states or for cor-
porations, tends to progress through at least four stages: (1) setting
standards; (2) monitoring compliance with standards and exposing
abuses; (3) creation of binding legal obligations; and (4) enforcement of
those binding laws.3 7 The human rights regime for governments is based
on: (1) standards set by the 1948 Universal Declaration on Human Rights;
(2) monitoring of human rights abuses by the UN Commission on Human
Rights plus many NGOs (Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch,
etc.); (3) binding international legal obligations under the terms of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Cov-
enant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and the many regional trea-
ties on human rights (the Council of Europe, the OAS, the OAU); (4)
enforcement of human rights by the regional human rights courts (in the
COE and the OAS), by the special tribunals created under the Security
Council (for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda) and, in the future, by
the new International Criminal Court.38
Is there now, or will there be, an international regime to govern corpo-
rate social responsibility? In regard to TNCs and labor rights, there appear
to be the seeds of a nascent regime or a "framework" regime.39 Standards
36. Stephen D. Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Inter-
vening Variables, in STEPHEN D. KRASNER, INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 1 (1983). For other
classic texts from the regime theory literature see ROBERT 0. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY:
COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN THE WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY (1984). See also John
Gerard Ruggie, International Responses to Technology: Concepts and Trends, 29 INT'L ORG
557 (1975); Susan Strange, Cave! hic dragones: A Critique of Regime Analysis, in KRASNER,
supra, at 337; Oran R. Young, International Regimes: Problems of Concept Formation, 32
WORLD POL. 331 (1980).
37. JACK DONNELLY, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 3-17 (2d ed. 1998).
38. For more on regime-building for both states and corporations, see William H.
Meyer, MNCs, Globalization, and Human Rights: Activism and Research to Build an Inter-
national Normative Regime, professional paper presented at the annual meetings of the
CISS/ISA, Washington, DC, 2000, available at http://hypatia.ss.uci.edu/brysk/
Meyer.html (last visited Oct. 14, 2001).
39. The term "framework regime" is suggested in analogy to "framework conven-
tion" in GARETH PORTER & JANET WELSH BROWN, GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS 20
(1991). For a definition of the term "generative regime", used in a similar way, see also
ORAN. R. YOUNG, GOvERNANCE IN WORLD AFFARs 31-32 (1999).
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have been set by the 1998 ILO Declaration on labor rights and by the many
codes of conduct that have been promulgated for TNC behavior. Monitor-
ing and exposing abuse of labor rights by TNCs is also well underway,
carried out by a host of interested NGOs (e.g., CorpWatch, Global
Exchange, United Students Against Sweatshops, etc.). The Global Com-
pact has made important contributions, both in terms of setting standards
(e.g., the GC's nine principles), and in terms of monitoring those standards
(e.g., the GC's website). However, this is where the similarities currently
end. There are no existing international legal obligations that require
cooperate social responsibility, let alone an effective way to enforce such
binding legal obligations (if and when they are created). Furthermore, the
issue of labor rights and TNCs may simply be too great in scope for the
creation of an area-specific regime.
Consider the many efforts to promote corporate social responsibility
that were reviewed in Part II of this article. These efforts cut across all of
the existing regimes for trade, monetary relations, and foreign aid. Trade
policy by the U.S. Congress, IMF and World Bank conditionality, economic
trends toward harmonization, people in the streets of Seattle in 1999
dressed as sea turtles, consumer boycotts of irresponsible TNCs, and the
Global Compact all have their roles to play in "governing" the politics of
TNCs and labor rights. Political management of corporate social responsi-
bility is too great of an undertaking, and exists at too many levels of analy-
sis, to be properly described as regime politics. What we are witnessing in
the global politics of cooperate social responsibility is more akin to what IR
theorists now call "global governance."
Global governance is political management at the global level of a
given area of human existence in the absence of global government. It is
global governance, not global government, because there is no World State
that can impose its rules and values on sovereign nation-states or renegade
TNCs. Theories of global governance transcend a focus on the nation-state
and the formal institutions of government. While theorists of global gov-
ernance (GG) acknowledge the continued importance and power of nation-
states, they also stress the rising influence of nonstate actors such as
NGOs, transborder interest groups, transnational epistemic communities,
and so forth. Through an interactive and multilayered process, GG is an
exercise in managing an issue such as corporate social responsibility via
the combined (and often conflicting) efforts of actors at the transnational,
international, regional, national, sub-national, and individual levels of anal-
ysis. Indeed, theorists of GG would caution against thinking in terms of
these old analytic categories (the old levels of analysis) if one seeks to
understand global politics in the new millennium.
Perhaps the best known theorist of global governance is James Rose-
nau.40 Rosenau suggests that we should now conceptualize global politics
40. The contested character of authority in the new international arena, and the
related challenges of achieving governance, have been discussed by Rosenau in James N.
Rosenau, Global Changes and Theoretical Challenges: Toward a Postinternational Politics
for the 1990s, in GLOBAL CHANGES AND THEORETICAL CHALLENGES: APPROAcHES TO WORLD
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in terms of "spheres of authority (SOAs)," rather than in terms of the old
levels of analysis.4 1 The old way of thinking defined the relevant political
actors by means of their position within the Westphalian model of an inter-
national community of nation-states. The new way of GG thinking defines
the relevant actors by means of their sphere of authority.
Take, for example, the multifaceted efforts to bring General Pinochet
to justice. In the old Cold War era, butchers like Pinochet murdered
thousands of innocents with absolute impunity under national and inter-
national law. In the post-Cold War era of global governance, actors operat-
ing within many distinct spheres of authority have combined their efforts,
seeking to try Pinochet before a court of law. To understand the processes
that may one day bring this man to account for his crimes against human-
ity, we must attend to the work of many different SOAs.
Some of the SOAs relevant to the new "Pinochet precedent" would
include: the court of a Spanish judge that handed down the first indict-
ment; the COE's regional treaty on human rights that includes Spain and
the United Kingdom as members; the 1948 Genocide Convention; the
1984 Convention Against Torture, including the date (1988) when the U.K.
ratified that convention; legal decisions and policy statements by the Brit-
ish courts, the House of Lords, and the Home Secretary regarding Spain's
request for extradition (while Pinochet was in the U.K.); Amnesty Interna-
tional's connection to one of the British judges; American, British and Chil-
ean foreign policy regarding Pinochet's claims to diplomatic immunity; and
finally, the domestic politico-legal cleavages in Chile that support or
oppose Pinochet. Before the Spanish judge indicted Pinochet in 1998, few
thought he would ever be held accountable for his actions, and there were
no effective means to try him inside Chile. After this exercise in global
governance was set in motion, and although he will probably never be tried
in Spain under the original indictment, there is now a viable campaign to
bring him to justice in his homeland.
Global governance is making a difference. The modalities of GG are
having an impact and are transforming politics at many different levels.
GG is a process that must be understood by all students of international
law in the 21St century.
While the Pinochet precedent and corporate social responsibility may
seem to be worlds apart, at an analytical level the two cases are remarkably
similar. In both instances we can see a plethora of actors that operate in
many different spheres of authority. In both cases, the interactions of
POLITICS FOR THE 1990S 1 (Ernst-Otto Czempiel & James N. Rosenau eds., 1989); JAMES
N. ROSENAU, TURBULENCE IN WORLD POLITICS: A THEORY OF CHANGE AND CONTINUITY
(1990); JAMES N. ROSENAU & MARY DuRFEE, THINKING THEORY THOROUGHLY: COHERENT
APPROACHES TO AN INCOHERENT WORLD (2000); JAMES N. ROSENAU, ALONG THE DOMESTIC-
FOREIGN FRONTIER: EXPLORING GOVERNANCE IN A TURBULENT WORLD (1997) [hereinafter
ROSENAU, ALONG THE DOMESTIc-FoREIGN FRONTIER]; James N. Rosenau, Diplomacy, Proof,
and Authority in the Information Age, in POWER AND CONFLICT IN THE AGE OF TRANS-
PARENcY 315 (Bernard I. Finel & Kristin M. Lord eds., 2000).
41. RoSENAU, ALONG THE DOMESTIc-FoREIGN FRONTER, supra note 40, at 145, 152-
153, 156-159.
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many players and numerous distinct SOAs combine to yield results that are
probably different from what any single actor is seeking. The "outputs" of
global governance are a (sometimes unpredictable) synthesis of the many
separate inputs. To return to TNCs, labor rights and environmental protec-
tion, we will conclude this article by surveying the emerging trends for
global governance in those areas.
IV. Conclusion: The Future of the Global Compact and Global
Governance for TNCs
Global governance to improve corporate social responsibility must be a
process that includes both the World Trade Organization and various non-
WTO initiatives. In this conclusion, we will start by looking at proposed
reforms within the WTO, and then move on to the non-WTO efforts.
In the past, the WTO could not have been expected to incorporate
labor or environmental standards into its mechanisms for regulating trade.
The primary objects of WTO regulation have always been products as
defined by their physical characteristics. However, international trade reg-
ulation has recently been expanded to include process factors as well. Pro-
duction processes, such as investment laws and intellectual property
rights, are now subject to international regulation under various WTO
agreements. Because environmental impact and labor relations are impor-
tant components of the production process, it is legitimate to consider the
extent to which they affect comparative advantage. No one who advocates
WTO regulation of workers' rights believes that labor conditions across all
countries must be rigidly uniform. We cannot expect minimum wages to
be identical in all nations. Rather, certain basic standards for labor rights
must be applied to all workers globally. Poor or abusive labor conditions
should not be used as a source of comparative advantage.
Prior to the Battle in Seattle, the Clinton administration claimed it
wanted to "put a human face" on the global economy. A new round of
global trade talks (the Millennium Round) was proposed in Seattle. As
part of the new round, the U.S. called for the creation of a WTO working
group on trade and labor standards. Working groups lay the groundwork
and draft resolutions for the plenary sessions of the WTO to consider. The
ILO was also given observer status at the WTO as a way to increase coordi-
nation between WTO and ILO activities.
Similar reforms are being made to bring environmental concerns into
the ambit of WTO authority. The U.S. is already conducting a review of the
environmental consequences of the new round. The WTO has an Environ-
ment and Trade Committee that could function much like the new working
group on labor, drafting new regulations that would enforce and improve
existing environmental protections within member governments (similar to
NAFTA's CEC). The U.S. will push to eliminate all tariffs on environmen-
tal technologies (e.g. greener industrial equipment) as a way to facilitate
trade in these goods, especially exports to the developing world. The U.S.
also demands that member governments be given the right to retain envi-
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ronmental standards that are higher than those required by existing inter-
national agreements.
U.S. policy also favors increased "transparency" within the WTO. As
stated in 1999 by Clinton's trade representative, transparency would
include: rapid release of documents; enhancing the input of NGOs;
allowing NGOs and other interested parties to file amicus curiae briefs at
WTO dispute panels; and opening dispute settlement proceedings to pub-
lic observers. 42 Dispute panels are the heart of the WTO sanctioning pro-
cess. They hand down authoritative decisions regarding trade disputes
between WTO members. WTO dispute panels have the power to impose
mandatory economic sanctions on noncompliant members. Dispute
panels have already heard over fifty cases since the establishment of the
WTO in 1995.
These dispute panels are the targets of the WTO's critics' primary con-
cerns. In part as a response to the unrest in Seattle, the U.S. restated and
emphasized its prior offer to open up the dispute panels to NGO participa-
tion. Labor and environmental groups would be given a seat at the hear-
ings and allowed to voice their concerns. Only WTO member
governments, however, have a vote in the final decisions on whether or not
to impose sanctions.
Many groups came to Seattle to pressure the WTO to open its proceed-
ings to nongovernmental labor, environmental, and Third World interests.
Global Exchange, Global Trade Watch and Third World Network were
among the most outspoken NGOs. Global Exchange criticized the WTO's
preference for making decisions behind closed doors. Global Trade Watch
fears that critics of the WTO will be either co-opted, or excluded from the
decision making process. Third World Network cautioned that more liber-
alization of trade by the WTO would lead to political instability and eco-
nomic hardships in developing nations. While these criticisms are
important, and especially relevant to the WTO's track record to date, there
is also much more common ground between the protestors and the posi-
tions of the OECD governments than either side seems to realize. Looking
ahead to the needed reforms within the WTO, both the short term and the
long term can bring important changes that could improve labor rights and
environmental protection.
Over the short term, the WTO should move quickly to: set up a work-
ing group on labor rights; bring NGOs and other interested groups to the
negotiating table; increase transparency by opening all WTO hearings and
documents to the public. All of these things could be done almost immedi-
ately. Over the mid-term (3-5 years), and within the context of the new
round, the WTO must draft an agreement on global labor standards (using
the ILO 1998 declaration as a guide). At the same time, a similar agree-
ment needs to be established for environmental standards. Over the long
42. Charlene Barshefsky, Toward Seattle: The Next Round and America's Stake in the
Trading System, Address Before the Council on Foreign Relations (Oct. 19, 1999), at
http://www.cfr.org/public/pubs/BarshefskyQATranscript.html (last visited Oct. 7,
2001).
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term, the WTO needs to establish a grievance process for violations of
labor rights and environmental destruction similar to the NAFTA mecha-
nisms in these areas. The WTO dispute panels for labor and the environ-
ment, like the NAOs and the CEC, must also be open to individual and
NGO petitions.
None of these reforms will come easily. It is important to note that the
strongest political opposition to new WTO authority over labor and envi-
ronmental standards comes from Third World governments. In many
cases, these are the same Third World countries in which most TNCs pre-
fer to set up their sweatshops. They are also the same countries favored by
TNCs because of their lax (or nonexistent) enforcement of environmental
protections. It is also worth restating that nothing proposed here would
bring legal or economic sanctions directly against the TNCs themselves.
The economic penalties would be imposed on national governments, with
the hope that this would induce those governments to tighten their reins on
transnational corporations.
Moreover, it must be understood that the WTO can not be the only
regulatory mechanism with respect to labor rights. It should be regarded
as one component of a comprehensive global governance structure, incor-
porating a large number of international organizations and transnational
arrangements, with the participation of TNCs, NGOs and other nonstate
actors. All of the necessary functions related to global governance can
hardly be transferred to a single entity, regardless of its enforcement capac-
ities. The comprehensive character of the issue area of labor standards
makes a global governance structure, comprising different institutions with
different SOAs, the only suitable and feasible way for providing interna-
tional regulation.
Furthermore, the incorporation of a new Trade-Related Labor Agree-
ment (TRLA) into the WTO would be meaningless if not accompanied by
increased market access for the exports of the developing countries. The
labor standards agenda has been widely criticized as a thinly disguised
form of neo-protectionism. This argument remains valid, as critical sectors
of world trade are still governed by specific agreements, and liberalization
in these areas is far from complete. The Agreement on Textiles and Cloth-
ing (ATC) is a case in point. Developed countries have failed to accelerate
either the restructuring of their textile industries or the liberalization of
their imports (as called for under the ATC), while at the same time insisting
on higher labor standards in the labor-intensive textile industries of the
developing countries. NGOs continue to provide evidence of workers'
rights abuse in the Third world and advocate sanctions. These same NGOs
need to urge Western governments to at least honor their commitments
under the ATC agreement, if not as a gesture of goodwill, then as a way to
speed up the liberalization process and to eliminate import quotas prior to
the ATC's 2005 deadline.
When sanctions are imposed in the future by the WTO under a yet-to-
be-established TRLA, they need to be applied according to what we have
519
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learned about "smart" sanctions.43 Lopez and Cortright's work on smart
sanctions creates a useful model for application of penalties when there are
violations of labor standards. Smart sanctions use a combination of car-
rots and sticks. First, smart sanctions create a "bargaining environment"
within which the targeted nations/TNCs would be given both penalties (for
past sins) and rewards (as behavior improves).44 Second, smart sanctions
require careful monitoring and enforcement as a way to decrease the nega-
tive impact of sanctions on third parties. The most important third parties
in this case would be the labor forces. Sanctions for violations of labor
rights should not be a system that indirectly worsens conditions for Third
World workers (e.g., increased unemployment). Here again, the Global
Compact has a useful role to play. The GC could be a vehicle for establish-
ing a more cooperative bargaining environment (coordinating its efforts
with the WTO and the ILO). The GC could also be expanded to provide
some of the necessary monitoring functions. Finally, smart sanctions
employ the tactic of "reverse targeting." 45
In this case, reverse targeting would mean expanding economic con-
tacts with TNCs that have a proven track record of corporate social
responsibility.
Moving beyond the WTO, many other proposals have been advanced
recently that could facilitate better global governance of TNCs. One way to
build on the Global Compact would be to create a new Global Development
Commission.46 The GDC would coordinate the activities of the Secretary
General, the WTO, the IMF, the World Bank, UNCTAD, and the UN Envi-
ronment Programme. It would be chaired by a high-profile public figure,
perhaps the Secretary General, and include the heads of all of the interna-
tional organizations with an interest in social and economic development.
"The commission approach appears to meet the pressing need to get some
big issues on the table at the highest level. If it succeeded in making
agency heads work together, as they have signally failed to do in the past,
then it would make a significant contribution to coherence in international
economic policy-making."47
Another intriguing proposal was advanced in Davos during 2001 by
Jean-Francois Rischard, the World Bank's Vice President for Europe. Risch-
ard advocates the creation of "Global Issue Networks."48 Global Issue Net-
works would be coalitions of interested nations, private companies, and
NGOs. They would set standards and use online polling via the Internet to
43. George A. Lopez & David Cortright, Economic Sanctions and Human Rights: Part
of the Problem or Part of the Solution?, 1 Ikr'L J. HUM. RTs. 1, 2 (1997).
44. David Cortright et al., Smart Sanctions: Restructuring UN Policy in Iraq, Report to
the Joan B. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies (2001), available at http://
www.nd.edu/--krocinst/research/smartreportapril.pdf (last visited Oct. 5, 2001).
45. George Lopez, Public Address at the University of Delaware, Mar. 12, 2001 (on
file with author).
46. See Editorial, One Way Out of the Labour Rights Mire, WORLD TRADE AGENDA, Nov.
20, 2000, at 16.
47. Id.
48. David Ignatius, Think Globally, Build Networks, WASH. PosT, Jan. 28, 2001, at B7.
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"issue ratings that measure how well countries and private businesses are
doing in meeting specified norms on the environment and other issues that
affect the welfare of the planet," such as labor standards. 49 One should not
underestimate the power of such online publicity. For decades, interna-
tional money laundering seemed to be a global problem with no solution.
Then a "global issue network" was created that published the names of
states that were laundering money for drug cartels and organized crime
syndicates. This online (unfavorable) publicity was all that it took to force
many of the most notorious havens for money laundering to change their
laws, effectively outlawing the most egregious abuses.50
Finally, a report from Human Rights Watch in December of 2000
called for the creation of an international policing agency with the
resources and power to enforce global labor standards. HRW, like other
critics of the WTO, believes that the WTO does not have the mandate or
the ability to enforce such rules.51 According to HRW, "The current system
to regulate global commerce [the WTO] leaves little or no room for human
rights," while globalization "generates human rights problems of global
dimension."-52
Perhaps Human Rights Watch and the many critics of the WTO are
correct. What is needed at the global level in regard to corporate social
responsibility is more than the WTO (or any other single organization) can
provide. What is needed is a system of global governance for labor rights
and environmental protection. Such a system, in our opinion, must
include the WTO, but it must also go beyond future reforms within the
WTO to include many additional mechanisms of global governance. The
Global Compact must be one of the elements of global governance over
corporate social responsibility.
49. Id.
50. Annual Report 1999-2000, Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Devel-
opment Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (22 June 2000), available at
http://www.oecd.org/fatf/pdf/AR2000-en.pdf (last visited Sept. 8, 2001). For a more
recent account of the OECD policies, see also FATF, Annual Report 2000-2001, availa-
ble at http://www.oecd.org/fatf/pdf/AR2001b-en.pdf. For trends in OECD regulation
and the record of its capacity building measures by creating broad public awareness, see
FATF document releases http://www.oecd.org/fatf/FATDocs-en.htm#Annual (last vis-
ited June 27, 2001). See also David Ignatius, Crackdown on Global Theft, WAsH. PosT,
Dec. 3, 2000, at B7.
51. Holger Jensen, Sad State of Human Rights Comes Home to Roost, Nuvs JouRNAL,
June 2, 2001, at A7.
52. Id.

